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Abstract. The Next Generation Air Transportation System will introduce new, advanced sensor technologies into the cockpit that 
must convey a large number 01 potentially complex alerts. OUf worl< focuses on the challenges associated with prioritizing aircraft 
sensor alerts in a quick and efficient manner, essentially determining when and how to alert the pilot This "alert decision" becomes 
very difficuH in NeKtGen due to the following challenges: 1) the increasing number of potential hazards, 2) the uncertainty associated 
with the state of potential hazards as well as pilot slate , and 3) the limited time to make safely-critical decisions. In this paper. we 
focus on pilot state and present a model for anticipating duration and quality of pilot behavior, for use in a larger system which 
issues aircraft alerts. We estimate pilot workload, which we model as being dependent on factors including mental effort, task 
demands. and task performance. We perform a mathematically rigorous analysis of the model and result ing alerting plans. We 
simulate the model in software and present simulated results with respect to manipulation of the pilot measures. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) 
technologies into the cockpit is expected to 
dramatical ly increase the responsibilities of 
the pilot (JPDO. 2007). In particular. 
additional aircraft alerting systems will be 
introduced, and the pilot will need to adapt 
to the increase in both the number and 
types of possible hazard alerts. NextGen 
will also introduce additional automation 
technologies into the cockpit , capable of 
addressing alerts with minimal assistance 
from the human pilot. However, interfacing 
these technologies with both the human 
pilot as well as the large number of possible 
hazard alerts introduces a set of research 
challenges, including how to prioritize the 
alerts, how to plan the interaction between 
human and automation to address the 
prioritized hazards, and how to adjust the 
plan according to the state and capabilities 
of the pilot. 
In order to address these challenges, 
Aptima, Inc., in cooperation with SAle and 
under the supervision of NASA, is 
developing a NextGen aircraft system called 
ALARMS (ALerting And Reasoning 
Management System). The system has four 
parts: Bayesian reasoning to determine type 
and priority of existing hazards, a Time 
Dependent Markov Decision Process 
(TMDP)-based planner to address the 
hazards in a timely fashion, a human 
performance estimator to inform the planner 
as to the state and capabili ties of the pilot, 
and an interface to inform the pilot of alerts 
in the best possible manner. 
In this paper, we concern ourselves with the 
third item , how to estimate pilot state and 
capabilities in order to inform a plan for the 
human and automation to cooperate. 
Defining a plan to cooperate has been the 
subject of empirical research (Galster, 2003; 
Galster & Parasuraman, 2003; 
Parasuraman & Riley; Parasuraman , 
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). One approach 
is to describe a level of automation in a 
continuum between fully automated hazard 
response, to fully manual hazard response 
(Wickens, Mavor, Parasuraman, & McGee, 
1998; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978). An 
extended method, proposed by 
Para sura man et aL models human 
information processing in four stages: 
Sensory Processing, Perceptionf\Norking 
Memory, Decision Making, and Response 
Selection (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000). Differing circumstances 
may call for differing stages of automation. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110012093 2019-08-29T18:32:45+00:00Z
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Figure 1: ALARMS System Diagram 
But which stage of automation is 
appropriate may depend on several 
variables, induding the characteristics of the 
hazards, as well as ~ pilot state, H the ability of 
the pilot to perform under a given stage of 
automation. In this paper we introduce a 
model for estimating pilot state on the 
aircraft, for the purposes of informing the 
hazard alerting system. The model 
leverages existing literature on pilot 
workload as well as pilot performance. The 
model in this paper uses three stages of 
automation, each of which corresponds to a 
flight deck display. In Stage 1 of 
automation, increasing workload will greatly 
decrease quality and increase duration for 
high workload conditions as compared to 
low workload conditions. In Stage 2, 
increasing workload will decrease quality 
and increase duration. In Stage 3, the 
effects will be negligible. 
The outline for the rest of the paper follows: 
First, we introduce the ALARMS system 
architecture and briefly outline its 
components, including a hazard state 
estimation module and a planning module 
for stages of automation. Next, we outline 
the pilot state estimation module, which 
estimates pilot workload. We show how the 
pilot state can be used as input for the 
ALARMS planning module. Finally , we show 
modeled results for how changes of pilot 
state will change temporal plans for stages 
of automation, and conclude with a 
summary and a discussion of future steps. 
2.0 BODY: ALARMS SYSTEM 
ARCHITECTURE 
The ALARMS system architecture is shown 
in Figure 1. Proceeding from left to right, 
multiple hazards exist in the environment 
and result in alerts on the fl ight deck. The 
hazards themselves, and the sensor alerting 
systems, are external to the ALARMS 
system. The alerts are issued to the 
ALARMS Integrated System User Model. 
The system alerts are treated as evidence, 
and from this evidence the ALARMS state 
estimation module estimates the actual 
hazards. A more detailed description of this 
estimate can be found in a companion 
paper to this work (9) . To summarize, a 
Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) is used. 
DBN's have been found in similar systems, 
notably in medical diagnosis (Shwe & 
Cooper. 1991). Our use of a DBN in the 
ALARMS system is analogous, if the system 
alerts are treated as ~symptomsH to estimate 
the UdiseaseH of the actual hazard. 
The hazard state is combined with the 
estimated state of the pilot (which we will 
return to in a moment), to form a complete 
state estimate. This pilot and hazard 
estimate is fed into a Planning module. The 
Planning module recommends the stage of 
automation for the hazards, which is fed into 
the ALARMS interface for display. The 
result is displayed to the pilot. 
In this work, we focus on the Human 
Performance module in the diagram. This 
module estimates the status of the pilot, 
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Figure 2 : Human Performance Module 
which in turn is used to estimate the 
performance of the pilot at each stage of 
automation. The planner will then select the 
appropriate stage of automation that 
maximizes the effectiveness of the 
combined pilot and automation. 
2,1 Human Performance Module 
We model human performance as shown in 
Figure 2. The Output from the module is an 
estimate of expected pilot performance, in 
terms of duration and quality of pilot 
handling of hazards. The Variable of 
Interest, Workload, is the key parameter 
representative of pilot state that changes 
over time and directly impacts performance. 
The Mediating Variable, Fatigue, influences 
the relationship. Other variables of interest 
(e.g., situation awareness) or mediating 
variables may be considered in future work. 
In environments with task demands, 
workload affects the mental resources that a 
pilot can access to address the demands 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000). Specifically, 
the effect can be modeled through a 
performance resource function, or PRF 
(Norman & Bobrow, 1975). VVhen cognitive 
resources are unavailable or unused for a 
task, performance will be diminished. As 
more resources are dedicated, performance 
wi ll improve, until the task becomes limited 
by data and not resources. \lVhen multiple 
tasks must be accomplished, such as is the 
case when a pilot must supervise multiple 
systems in the cockpit, resource limitation 
becomes an issue (Kantowitz & Casper, 
1988). The workload of the pilot will define 
the availability of a pilot's resources to 
handle alerts. 
It is possible to assess workload as an 
index, and several criteria have been 
specified to compute the index (Wickens & 
Hollands, 2000; O'Donnell & Eggemeier, 
1986). Among these criteria: a satisfactory 
workload index is sensitive to changes in 
task demands, diagnoses the cause of 
workload variation , is selective in that 
factors that do not affect workload are not 
included in the index, is unobtrusive in that 
the computation of the index does not affect 
workload itself, and is reliable. 
For ALARMS, we identify three factors that 
oredict workload: mental effort. task 
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demands, and ongoing task performance. 
We also identify relevant measures of these 
factors from the literature. 
2.1.1 Mental Effort 
We follow the literature by specifying mental 
effort as a contributing factor to workload. 
High levels of performance can be achieved 
under conditions of normal mental effort 
while extremely high mental effort situations 
tend to result in decreased performance. 
Measures of mental effort include both 
subjective and physiological measures 
(Veltman. 2001). 
Subjective information in our model 
includes potential measures such as the 
NASA TLX scale (Hart & Staveland, 1988), 
which allows the operator to specify mental 
demand , physical demand, temporal 
demand , performance, effort, and frustration 
level. The Bedford Workload scale (Roscoe, 
1984), on the other hand, is a decision tree, 
and the leaves of the tree provide a 
workload score on a single dimension. 
Physiological information can also be 
obtained . Examples of potential measures 
include electroencephalography (EEG) or 
heart rate variability (HRV). It has been 
shown that heart rate can differentiate 
between phases of flight (which require 
different levels of mental effort) for pilots 
and co-pilots (Bonner & Wilson, 2002), even 
when subjective measurements do not. 
2.1.2 Task Demands 
In the prior subsection, mental effort is 
described as being necessary to accomplish 
tasks. The level of effort demanded wi ll 
depend on the task. Simple tasks will 
require smaller amounts of resources, while 
complex tasks will require a higher degree 
of mental effort. Measures of Task 
Demands include both the complexity of 
tasks and the number of tasks. 
Task complexity can affect workload; 
specifically, complex tasks will result in a 
higher workload. For example, the landing 
phase of flight produces higher workload 
than the enroute phase (Bonner & Wilson, 
2002). As a second example, more 
automated tasks consume fewer resources 
than less automated ones (Schneider & 
Fisk. 1982). 
Number of tasks affects workload as well , 
in two ways. First, the presence of 
additional tasks adds to workload. Second, 
there is a cost to switching among tasks 
(Rogers & Mansell . 1995). Thus. the 
contribution of tasks to workload exceeds 
the sum of the tasks complexities. 
2.1.3 Ongoing Task Performance 
Workload contributes to the model insofar 
as it is predictive of pilot performance. Thus, 
a well-accepted manner of estimating 
workload is to examine performance 
directly. Potential measurements indude 
Flight Technical Errors, Navigation 
Errors, and Communication Errors. 
These errors can be measured by the 
ALARMS system at run-time. 
2.2 Interface to ALARMS Planner 
The goal of estimating pilot Workload is to 
predict the quality and duration of pilot 
actions so that a joint piloVautomation plan 
can be formed to address hazards. In this 
section, we describe the details of the 
interface to the planner. We begin by 
summarizing the planner itself, as 
introduced in (Carlin , Marecki, & Schurr, 
2010) and adjusted in this paper to account 
for pilot state. 
2.2.1 ALARMS TMDP Planner 
We model the ability of the pilot and system 
to address hazards with a Time-Dependent 
Markov Decision Process (TMDP) (Boyan.& 
Littman, 2000). A TMDP is a tuple 
<S,A,P,D,R>, where S is a set of states, A 
represents a set of actions, P is a transition 
matrix, 0 is a set of probability density 
functions , and R is a reward. Assume a 
finite set S of discrete states and a finite set 
A of actions. \I'vtlen the state s in S, and 
action action a in A is executed, the process 
transitions with probability P(s,a,sJ to state 
s ' in S. The transition consumes t units of 
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time with probability d(s,a,s ', t) , where 
d(s,a,s ', t) is a probability density function 
over t for a given s,a, and s '. Similarly, the 
reward R(s,a,s) depends on s, a, and s '. 
Reward occurs when an action terminates. 
A deterministic TMDP policy is a mapping 
S x [0 ,<,>] -> .<) where <'> (the deadline) is the 
earliest point in time after which all rewards 
are zero. 
Let \f1 be a set of alert levels (e.g. "Nominal" 
(N) , "Advisory" (A), "Caution" (C), "Warning" 
(W), or "Directive" (0 )), <I> be an ordered set 
of hazards, and n be a set of autonomy 
stages. A TMDP problem in ALARMS is 
defined as follows: 
• States A state s in S is a mapping 
from the hazards to their aleret 
levels. For example, given three 
hazards, state s = <G,N, W> defines 
that the first hazard is at Caution 
level, the second hazard is at 
Nominal level , and the third hazard 
is at a Warning level. 
• Actions The actions of the ALARMS 
system represent the different ways 
in which the system displays the 
information about the hazards on the 
pilot's GUI. Each component of an 
action represents a stage of 
autonomy. For example, given three 
hazards, action a = <1,3,2> will 
present three hazards at stages 1,3, 
and 2 of autonomy. It is possible to 
represent different hazards at the 
same stage of autonomy (e.g. 
<2,2,2» . 
• Transitions: ALARMS assumes that 
all hazards will eventually be 
addressed (their alert levels will 
return to N as a result of human or 
autonomy actions. An exception is 
when the action is not to address the 
hazard at any stage of automation 
(e.g. <0» , in which case the state 
remains the same for that hazard. 
• Durations: ALARMS models action 
duration distributions by assuming 
that actions at differing stages of 
automation take different durations. 
The specific durations of actions will 
be affected by pilot state, as we will 
specify in the next section. 
• Reward: Reward is achieved for 
addressing the hazard and 
transitioning back to a nominal state. 
Each hazard can have a different 
reward associated with it. Reward 
will also depend on the pilot state, as 
we wi ll see in the next section. 
2.2.2 Pilot State in ALARMS TMOP 
As shown in Figure 2, Workload affects the 
duration and quality of pilot actions in the 
ALARMS model. This is accomplished by 
performing a two step process. First, a 
workload score is computed from 
measurements of factors . This is 
accomplished through a linear weighting of 
the factors : 
Workload ~ a 'ME + P'7D + y'TP 
where ME represents Mental Effort, TO 
represents Task Demands, and TP 
represents Task Performance. 0., ~, and r 
represent linear weights that allow the 
prioritization of the factors to be varied. 
In the second step, the workload score is 
used to modify the Duration and Reward 
functi on of the ALARMS TM DP. We use the 
Workload estimate to feed information into 
the Integrated User Module about the 
expected capabilities of the pilot, specifically 
the expected performance quality and the 
expected duration of pilot actions. The effect 
of Workload varies according to the stage of 
automation. In Stage 1 of automation, 
increasing workload in our model w ill greatly 
decrease quality and increase duration for 
high workload conditions as compared to 
low workload conditions. In Stage 2, 
increasing workload will decrease quality 
and increase duration. In Stage 3, we make 
the effects negligible. 
The specific quantities attached to these 
terms "greatly decrease", etc, are 
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Figure 4: High Workload Plan 
parameters in our model. At present, we set 
quality and duration to halve and double, 
respectively, in Stage 1, when workload is 
changed from Low to High. Similarly we set 
quality and duration to decrease and 
increase 25% in Stage 2, and to decrease 
and increase 5% in Stage 3. Medium 
workload is currently simulated by 
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interpolating between the high and low 
workload conditions. 
3.0 DISCUSSION/EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate the effect of the factors 
on workload and on existing plans, an 
ALARMS System Designer Interface was 
developed. The interface is shown in Figure 
3. On the top, multiple system alerts can be 
specified at various levels of alert. 
Directives are the highest priority of alert, 
followed by Warnings, Cautions, and 
Advisories. The entries "TCAS" and "Traffic 
information display" are indicative of a loss 
of separation hazard, and the entries 
"Landing Gear" and "Flight deck display" are 
indicative of a system failure hazard 
encountered while landing. Thus, we see in 
the figure that there is a caution-level alert 
for loss of separation, and a lower-priority 
advisory for a system failure hazard. Below 
the hazards, the factors affecting pilot state 
are specified, including Mental Effort, Task 
Demands, and Task Performance. Each 
factor is given a weight (corresponding to 
n , p, y), in this case the weights are all 1.0. 
The figure shows that factors are all 
selected as "Low," and thus the pilot is 
under low workload conditions. 
Below, we see a time-dependent plan for 
addressing the hazards, as computed by 
ALARMS. The x-axis is in time units. 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that 
the tasks have a Udeadline" at the 20 unit 
mark on the x-axis , and the plan works 
backwards from that mark. The y-axis 
shows the utility of the plan (on a relative 
scale to the ALARMS planning problem). As 
expected, utility decreases as the deadline 
approaches. The figure shows that 
ALARMS produces a 3-part plan for 
addressing the hazards under these 
conditions. Each part of the plan consists of 
the letter UL" followed by a stage of 
automation for each hazard, thus "L 11" 
denotes that both hazards are handled at a 
stage of automation of 1, "L 12" indicates 
that the loss of separation hazard is handled 
at stage 1 and the system failure hazard is 
handled at stage 2. The figure shows that 
when there are more than 8 time units 
remaining , the hazards are both handled at 
Stage 1 of automation. As the deadline 
approaches, the recommended stage of 
automation transitions to "L 12," that is, the 
lower priority hazard is handled at a higher 
stage of automation. Within 1.5 time units of 
the deadline, the stage of automation 
transitions to "L 13" the lower priority hazard 
is handled at Stage 3 of automation. 
Figure 4 shows a second plot. Here, the 
Phase of Flight has been changed to Land, 
Mental Effort and Task performance are 
labeled as indicating "High" workload 
conditions, and Task Demands are 
"Medium." This is a higher workload 
condition than the first example. As a result, 
the ALARMS planner is informed that low 
stages of automation will be less effective. 
The resulting plan at the bottom of the figure 
shows that higher stages of automation are 
selected at earlier points in time. 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we introduced a model 
designed to predict pilot performance in the 
cockpit, proposed to be implemented as a 
component of NextGen alerting systems. 
The larger ALARMS system design consists 
of Bayesian reasoning to determine type 
and priority of existing hazards, a Time 
Dependent Markov Decision Process-based 
planner to address the hazards in a timely 
fashion, a human performance estimator to 
inform the planner as to the state and 
capabilities of the pilot, and an interface to 
inform the pilot of alerts in the best possible 
manner. In this paper we focused on a 
model to contribute to the human 
performance estimator. 
Key components of the model are that it 
estimates workload, it predicts the duration 
and quality of pilot performance, and it can 
be used to recommend what information will 
be displayed to the pilot, and what 
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information processing stage will be 
supported. 
Future work consists of several directions. 
First, we wi ll focus on the real-time nature of 
the measures, and how such 
measurements can be integrated into the 
cockpit in an unobtrusive manner. Second, 
we wi ll embellish the model further. For 
example, the literature on task switching as 
well as issues related to attention (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908) can be added to the model. 
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• 10- Computer Decides everything, acts autonomously 
• 9 - Informs human if it decides to 
• 8 - Informs human only if asked 
• 7 - Executes then informs 
• 
• 4 - Suggests one alternative 
• 3 - Narrows selection to a few 
• 2 - Offers complete set of alternatives 
• 1 - No computer assistance 
·Wickens 1998, based on Sheridan and Verplank 1978 
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• Example 4 stage model 
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- Information acquisition 
- Information analysis 
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Automation 
Information Support 
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Mock-up s designed by Andy Chang M.S. and Dr. Amy Alexander 
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Information 
automatically 
displayed on right 
Mock-up s designed by Andy Chang M.S. and Dr. Amy Alexander 
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Decision Support 
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Refinement 
Measures 
PhysiOlogical Measures 
~g. , EEG, HRV) 
Subjective Measures (e.g., 
Bedford Scale, NASA TLX 
~mber of TaSkS=:} 
~PleXity of Tasks 
~Technical Errors 
Factors 
• Menial Effort 
• Task Demands 
Ongoing Task ~ig"iOO E"orn q ...... p.'". o. '.m.'". oe_ ... 
[ communication Erro0 ! 
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Workload 
• Workload 
Variables of Interest 
W_(PiIoI 
S .... ) 
Mediating 
Variable 
Fatigue 
Performance Response Function (PRF) 
Finite amount of resource able to be allocated to problem 
Time Sharing 
Automaticity 
• 
Satisfactory workload Index has these properties: 
<t>201D,,aptJmo,lnc 
Diagnoses cause of va riati on 
Selective offa ctors 
Unobtrusive 
Reliable 
Outputs 
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• Mental Effort 
- Subjective Inform ation 
• NASA TLX sca le 
• Bedford Workl oad Scale 
- Physiolog ica l Inform ation (EEG, HRV) 
• Task Demands 
- Task Complex ity 
- Number of Tasks 
• Ongoing Task Performance 
<t>201D."PtJmo,lnc 
Refinement 
• Mental Effort , Task Demands, and Ongoing Task 
Performance are used to compute Workload 
- We model these as Low/Med ium/High, take linear combination 
- Workload = a*M E + ~ * TD + ,* TP 
- Workload is combined w ith information about hazard state and 
stage of automation to determine the quality and duration of 
action. 
• Increasing Pilot Workload leads to: 
- Greatly decreasing quality, increasing duration in Stage 1 
- Decreasing quality, increasing duration in Stage 2 
- Very small effects in Stage 3 
• Thus, increasing Pilot Workload will tend to increase the 
stage of automation. 
<t>201D,,aptJmo,lnc 
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• Design Approach -
- Define Alerting Levels 
02009,,aptJmo,lnc 
<10 seconds 
10-15 seconds 
< 40 seconds 
non-cr itica l 
Defi ne Hazard List 
System Failure 
System Performance Compromised 
Loss of Separati on 
Adverse W eath er Encounter 
Altitude Deviati on 
Navigati on Deviati on 
Human 
Wor1l.load 
Estimator 
23 Ex isti ng Systems Reviewed 
13 NextGen Planned Systems 
Reviewed 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
Crew Incapacitati on 
Flight Perform ance Compromised 
Stru ctural Failure 
Life Support 
Protected Airspace Incursion 
Loss of Communicati on 
Runway Incursion 
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..,..m """~ 
:::':,'; Perform ance Loss of Weather 
_ .... 
Comproml~ Sepill"irtlon Encounter 
..... -TDOIs/Temnoloev/Systerm Sub-Systems 
~. I I I 
* 
I 
I 
I I 
~ I I 
I I 
I 
I 
A=Advisory, C=Caution, W=Warning 
Blue=Aviation, Green=Navigation , Purple=Cornrnunication 
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Subsystem 
Alert 
Cau1ions AdVisories 
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-" ~=';: :'-_ I ALARMS 
Human 
Workload 
Estimator 
.. rterfllce 
• TM DP model (Boyan and Littman 2000) 
<S,A,P,d,R> 
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Set of States: Mapping from hazards to alert levels 
• Example: <N.A,\V> 
Set of Actions: Stage of Automation for each hazard 
• Stage 1 = human-centric. Stage 3 = highly automated 
• Example <13.2> 
Probabilistic Transitions: PCS,8,S ' ) 
Action Durations: Probability Density Function dCs,8,s' ,t) 
• Deadline tl after which there is no reward 
• More automated actions: Quicker 
Reward for addressing hazard and returning to nominal state 
• More automated actions: Lower reward 
Policy: Mapping from state and time to action 
 670 
 
 
Refinement 
• Mental Effort, Task Demands, and Ongoing Task 
Performance are used to compute Workload 
- We model these as Low/Medium/High, take linear combination 
- Workload = a*ME + ~'TD + Y* TP 
- Workload is combined w ith information about hazard state and 
stage of automation to determine the quality and duration of 
action. 
• Increasing Pilot Workload leads to: 
- Greatly decreasing quality, increasing duration in Stage 1 
- Decreasing quality, increasing duration in Stage 2 
- Very small effects in Stage 3 
• Thus, increasing Pilot Workload will tend to increase the 
stage of automation. 
<t>201D."PtJmo,lnc 
(Mareck, et al 2007) 
• Define values V(s)(t) 
• Expected Reward (for Bellman Backup) 
arg max (L P(s' ls, a) r' P"a(t')(R(s , a, s') + V'(s')(t - t'))dt' ) 
aEA(.9) Joo s/ES 
• Since continuous, need approximate value functions 
- Convolution becomes intractable 
- Solution: phase-type distri butions 
j' p(t')V(s)(t-t') d, 
I" 
- Convert to MDP w ith uniform action durations 
<t>201D,,aptJmo,lnc 
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Conclusions 
• Contributions of ALARMS 
- Introduced system architecture 
- Developed interface mockups 
- Identified current and future hazards 
- Bayesian reasoning over uncertain hazard state and sensor 
systems 
- TMDP planning of interface stages of automation 
• TMDP planning reasons about time duration uncertainty 
• TMDP model is adaptable to empirical findings 
- Accounts for pilot state 
- Developed system designer interface for understanding system 
behavior 
• Future work 
- System integration and empirical evaluation 
<t>201D."PtJmo,lnc 
Questions? 
Questions? 
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